The World That Outlived the Movement

The Permission Sstructure, Part Four

This essay is Part Four of The Permission Structure. This article provides the history of how Generation Identity’s core concept – “remigration” – transitioned from a Viennese apartment to a Potsdam mansion to the lips of politicians throughout Britain and America.

I. The Roof Above Poitiers

On October 20th, 2012, approximately 70 young activists ascended upon the roof of an unfinished mosque situated along the periphery of Poitiers in western-central France. Upon the rooftop, they erected a banner that bore a singular number - 732 - representing the year Charles Martel thwarted the Umayyad advance into Francia during a battle near Poitiers. In addition to the number, the banner also included the name of their organisation: Generation Identity. They remained atop the roof for several hours. Every moment of the time they spent on top of the building was recorded, by them.

One month prior to ascending upon the roof, Generation Identity publicly announced itself through an official video. Monochromatic images of youthful faces appeared in succession, while a crescendoing string arrangement played in the background. Each of these individuals stated that they were “a generation torn apart ethnically,” and that their parents who participated in May 1968 had given up control of the nation. During this sequence, a bearded young individual gazed directly at the camera and declared that the video represented not merely a call to arms but an actual declaration of war (Hope Not Hate, 2019b). None of the participants in the video wore shaved heads. Instead, students appeared, along with a lambda symbol taken from a Hollywood film depicting Spartans, and an organised script.

French Prime Minister François Hollande referred to it as an assault against the republic. The Interior Minister, Manuel Valls, described it as a detestable and unacceptable provocation (AP, 2012) and subsequent prosecution resulted. By December of 2017, five members of Generation Identity were found guilty of inciting racial hatred. Four members were sentenced to one year in prison with suspensions for five years and were deprived of their civil liberties. In June of 2020 the appeals court in Poitiers overturned the convictions of all five members due to procedural issues. An Imam representing the mosque stated that he felt that justice was not served regarding his community (France 3 Nouvelle-Aquitaine, 2020).

None of that mattered to the people on the roof. The point of the occupation was never the mosque being built, and it was not really the courtroom either. The point was the footage.

Generation Identity created video content. While they were staging events such as occupations, border demonstrations, and eventually a chartered vessel, each event was determined successful or unsuccessful based on what they captured on camera. The video content was not intended as recruitment. The video content was designed to sell vocabulary.

II. The French Laboratory

TThe organisational lineage is short and disreputable. Unité Radicale, a militant nationalist splinter group was banned by France in 2002 after one of its followers attempted to assassinate then-President Jacques Chirac at Paris’ Bastille Day celebration. One year later Unité Radicale’s remnants formed Bloc Identitaire - a “movement of ideas.” Bloc Identitaire learned its first lesson of dissolving: the organisation is expendable as long as the network remains intact. In 2012 Bloc Identitaire established a youth wing and it was this youth wing that occupied the roof.

The intellectual roots are longer and more significant. The Nouvelle Droite, a body of theory developed around Alain de Benoist’s GRECE think tank since 1968 posited one fundamental premise that all of this hinges upon: that the far-right lost the 20th Century politically and lost it culturally. Therefore, the path back to power is to focus on language rather than electioneering. Benoist read Gramsci and drew the lesson, he felt’ the left had stopped applying. if you alter what can be said about something, you alter what can be done about it. Guillaume Faye - who functioned as the even harder edge within the Nouvelle Droite - put it into his own words - metapolitics - which refers to “the social dissemination of ideas and cultural values for the purpose of creating profound, long-lasting political transformations” (Teitelbaum, 2019); And Faye supplied the euphemism that made his ethnopolitics presentable: "ethnopluralism", the doctrine that every people deserves its own homeland, which sounds like a UNESCO pamphlet and functions as a deportation programme.

As previously outlined in Part Three of this series: Renaud Camus - a writer/diarist of formerly respectable standing - condensed the entirety of his heritage into two words in 2011. Le Grand Remplacement -- Camus encapsulated the entire 40-year metapolitical endeavor of the Nouvelle Droite into a consumable term. What the Nouvelle Droite continued to lack was a means to distribute Le Grand Remplacement from its small-press publications into the mouths of people who would never read one.

There exists a date between Le Grand Remplacement and the roof at Poitiers. On July 22nd, 2011 - 15 months prior to occupying the roof at Poitiers - Anders Behring Breivik committed murder in Norway killing 77 people including mostly adolescents attending a Labor Youth Camp at Utøya Island. The rationale behind Breivik’s actions lay in his desire to prevent Islamicisation in Europe. His sources ran through the adjacent counter-jihad canon, Bat Ye'or's Eurabia rather than Camus, but the diagnosis was the same inheritance: a Europe being replaced with the complicity of its own elites. The identitarians launched their clean-cut, expressly nonviolent brand into a continent that had just watched where that diagnosis leads. The packaging was not incidental to the timing. A movement selling replacement panic after Utøya could not afford to look like anything but students on a roof.

This is identotarians founding wager: they will neither seek electoral success nor produce journals nor construct a mass party. Rather they proposed to serve as packaging. A movement comprised of less than 400 activists - each impeccably attired - schooled in using cameras - producing stunts crafted specifically for television news broadcasts and increasingly for platforms without televised news coverage: this represents metapolitics equipped with a marketing division. The Bloc’s elder statesmen had learned from Unité Radicale that the state may dissolve an organisation. However, according to the Nouvelle Droite: the state cannot eliminate a word.

III. The Salesman

Vienna became the face of the delivery mechanism. Martin Sellner, came from the actual neo-Nazism of Austria, was mentored as a teen by Gottfried Küssel, a convicted multiple time Holocaust denier. In 2006, at 17, Sellner told police he placed a swastika on the Synagogue in Baden Bei Wien with a companion. For this crime he was given 100 hours of Community Service at the local Jewish Cemetery as part of a Diversion Agreement that allowed him to avoid being tried. Sellner considers himself guilty of juvenile error. One thing Sellner got right was that the scene represented a dead-end since it was so obviously what it was. Then French footage arrived – translated within days – and within months of the video and the Poitiers occupation, identitarian groups using the lambda and world view had begun appearing across Europe (Nissen, 2020). Sellner’s was one of the first. Sellner formed the Austrian branch of the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich based upon what he saw — and fitted his own legacy into daylight: no uniforms, no runes, no salutes, no denial of anything. Polished jackets, gym memberships, irony and YouTube. The Poitiers footage found its first customers.

Sellner’s role in the network was never real leadership. It was translation. Sellner is bilingual, well-presentable and incredibly disciplined when it comes to vocabulary and he realised before everyone else that the product of the movement needed another word. “The Great Replacement” identified the alleged problem. It required a solution that could be said aloud — something that sounded nothing like the last century. The word he decided upon, taken from French identitarian usage and refined over ten years of speaking, interviewing and ultimately writing in a book-length proposal, was remigration.

Martin Sellner - The face of the new right

“Deportation,” describes an act performed by a State on a person. “Remigration” describes no actor whatsoever. Remigration is grammatically merely a return; i.e., a happening such as tides moving out again. It transforms expulsion into restoration. Moreover, it assumes the hierarchy this series is concerned with: in other words, the people to be remigrated are already in the word itself ordered according to their status. A politician who says “remigration” has acepted the sorting before the sentence reaches its verb. That is why the word, and not the movement, is the story.

IV. Defend Europe

As funds increased so did the stunts. By May 2017 the network began crowdfunding a naval operation under the name “Defend Europe.” Their announced goal was to disrupt NGO search and rescue efforts in the Central Mediterranean; in less than a month they had collected more than $150,000 from many U.S.-based sources via crowdfunding platforms, and alt-right amplification machines (InfoMigrants, 2017). Ultimately, the Defend Europe mission imploded. The chartered vessel — the C-Star —was refused fuel in Greece and Tunisia and held up in the Suez Canal for improper documentation on the crew list. At one point, the C-Star drifted without power, due to engine failure, and a rescue NGO attempted to provide aid. Patreon took down Defend Europe’s funding page citing that the campaign appeared to be collecting monies for activities “likely to result in loss of life” (Buzzfeed News, 2017). The identitarians proclaimed success and published the footage.

The same paradigm played out in the Alps. On April 18th 2018 more than a hundred activists conducted an operation at Col de l’Échelle, a mountainous border crossing between France and Italy used by migrants attempting to enter France from Italy. Activists utilised rental helicopters, a small plane, patrol vehicles and constructed a plastic barrier across the road. In August 2019 a court in Gap imposed prison sentences on three leaders of Defend Europe: Clément Gandelin, Romain Espino and Damien Rieu, for six months each for engaging in acts likely to be mistaken for exercising a public function; and issued fines totaling €75,000 against Defend Europe; the court emphasised how grave these crimes were (Euronews, 2019). However, in December 2020 their convictions were overturned on appeal.

If you read Defend Europe as border operations — they failed to prevent migration. If you read them as communication — they succeeded completely in doing what they were intended to do. Before Defend Europe produced images showing migrant rescue vessels operating as ferry services, it was becoming increasingly common in mainstream Italian politics to refer to those vessels as “sea taxis” — Luigi Di Maio, Deputy Speaker of the Chamber and rising star of Italy’s Five Stars Movement referred to them as such just four weeks prior to Defend Europe’s launch of their sea-faring effort (Cusumano and Villa, 2020). The images Defend Europe created were instrumental in transforming an insinuation into an ideology — that is: civilian vessels carrying young European citizens encountering rescue vessels at sea followed by scenes of activists wearing identical blue jacketed uniforms “blocking” an Alpine border that neither national government would seal. Only two months after their Alpine blockade operation Italy’s newly appointed Interior Minister blocked access to Italian harbors for the Aquarius — flagship of the migrant rescue fleet. While Defend Europe did not produce this policy — they provided images that gave politicians an excuse to block access to harbors for migrant rescue fleets — which is essentially what metapolitics means in action.

There existed another audience — one that the movement consistently denied they ever targeted. The ads were getting attention from individuals who had no interest in metapolitics.

V. Christchurch

On March 15, 2019 Brenton Tarrant killed 51 worshipers at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. He entitled his pre-attack manifesto The Great Replacement. This series does not include any quotes or content from his manifesto — only references to it — and will therefore make no reference to it. What belongs here is the money.

An Austrian prosecutor’s office investigated after finding evidence that Tarrant had donated roughly €1,500 to Sellner’s organisation, Identitäre Bewegung Österreich in 2018 — more than twice the normal size of donations they receive (Al Jazeera, 2019a). Prosecutors raided Sellner’s home in Vienna and confiscated his electronic devices. Sellner confirmed that Tarrant had sent him money — and stated that he responded positively to Tarrant’s email thanking him for his contribution. Germany’s Federal Police informed members of Parliament that Tarrant paid approximately €2,200 to Génération Identitaire in France in September 2017; initially the French organisation claimed to have received nothing from Tarrant but subsequently found two payments and forwarded that information to authorities (Al Jazeera, 2019b). Later it was discovered that Sellner and Tarrant had exchanged emails (Daily Record, 2019). New Zealand’s Royal Commission of Inquiry into Attack (2020) listed both donations as part of Tarrant’s financing of far-right organisations — along with his involvement with online communities where replacement ideologies were promoted.

Sellner’s denials should be recorded verbatim. “I have nothing to do with this terrorist attack,” Sellner wrote on social media immediately after police searched his home; he described his group as non-violent anti-immigrant movement; he suggested Tarrant contributed money specifically in order to incriminate him. No charges were filed against Sellner regarding the attack. The U.S. revoked Sellner’s Visa Waiver Travel Authorisation; he had plans to get married in America that summer.

Legally: Money went from the Christchurch killer to an identitarian group in two different countries; the identitarian group’s top individual publicly thanked him for it; and no Court has determined that the group assisted with the massacre. Assistance is not what we’re claiming here. The man who committed the most lethal white-supremacist attack of the decade named his justification with the network's phrase and funded the network's work with his money.

VI. The British Franchise

The United Kingdom got its franchise in 2017. At double speed the full arc of the movement was permitted. For Generation Identity UK & Ireland the initial enthusiasm was short-lived. An undercover investigation by ITV, together with Hope Not Hate, captured Sellner using a racial slur while discussing preparations for the banner drop. Following that episode the first head of the branch resigned (Hope Not Hate, 2019a). It was led thereafter by Tom Dupre, a former investment banker. The recruitment base was never EDL’s terraces; it was universities and graduates with salaries that provided the British installment of the movement’s central thesis: Racism for people who thought they were too intelligent for it.

At least initially, the government treated the network as what it really was. The Home Office detained Sellner and his fiancéé, American commentator Brittany Pettibone, for three days in March 2018. They were expelled from England, based upon a determination that their presence here was “not conducive to the public good” (AP, 2018). Instead of Sellner, a version of a speech he intended to deliver at Speaker’s Corner was delivered by Stephen Yaxley Lennon. He performed as Tommy Robinson. This further clarified the relationship between the European identitarian movement and Britain’s domestic street movement than could have any study. Two months later, the organisation’s first conference in Britain took place in Sevenoaks. Due to a last-minute cancellation of its London venue, the event did take place. Both Sellner and a co-leader from Hungary were denied admission.

British contribution to the movement was less an organisation than evidence of the vocabulary’s portability. By July 2019 the organisation had devolved to distributing free food to homeless individuals in Glasgow. According to multiple sources, only white recipients were eligible for assistance. Multiple reports criticised the actions of the city council and local organisations assisting homeless residents (The Scotsman, 2019). Its remaining elements soon dissolved into insignificance. Some of those who remained joined or became absorbed into other fringe groups such as Patriotic Alternative (Part III) and domestic groupuscule churn. As an organisation Generation Identity UK was, as described by Hope Not Hate, a runt of the litter.

As previously noted, however, an organisation was merely disposable. The franchise provided something else -- the vocabulary -- and once introduced to British society the vocabulary quickly found itself being used within an environment whose indigenous idiom was rooted in more crude BNP style race politics. Part III details how that legacy came to settle. The word had entered British circulation. It would wait there for a carrier with better distribution.

VII. The Bans

The identitarian network was banned across Europe by Facebook and Instagram in 2018 pursuant to their policies against organised hate. The bans severed all connections between the networks and the audiences its entire model had been built to reach. YouTube subsequently demonetised its flagship channels and then deleted them entirely. In March 2021 the French state issued a decree dissolving Génération Identitaire. The decree stated that Génération Identitaire exhibited characteristics of a private militia and cited among the reasons for its decision the fact that Génération Identitaire accepted financial contributions from Brenton Tarrant, who attacked Christchurch mosques in 2019 (Al Jazeera, 2021; DW, 2021). France’s highest court refused to suspend implementation of the decree stating that the organisation advocated for an ideology promoting hatred and violence (Conseil d’Etat, 2021). Austria passed legislation forbidding use of symbols associated with Génération Identitaire. Germany’s domestic intelligence agency had classified the Identitäres Forum as an extreme right wing terrorist organisation since 2019 and thus subjected it to surveillance and related stigma that designation carries (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2019). The British franchise, as we have seen, had already collapsed under its own incompetence.

By the end of 2021, every organisational element that had built the brand was banned, dissolved, deplatformed or defunct. A state looking at its counter-extremism dashboard would have recorded a clean win. Every assumption underneath that clean win was false.

The dissolution decrees named organisations. The platform bans named accounts. The word was not a defendant in any proceeding, and the word was the asset. The Nouvelle Droite's original wager, that language would outlive any vehicle carrying it, was about to be vindicated more completely than Benoist can have imagined, in a lakeside hotel outside Potsdam.

VIII. The Villa

On 25 November 2023, around two dosen people met at the Landhaus Adlon, a guesthouse on the Lehnitzsee near Potsdam. The gathering was private, invitation-only, organised around a presentation billed in the invitation as a masterplan. The speaker was Martin Sellner. His subject was remigration.

In January 2024 the investigative outlet Correctiv published its reconstruction of the meeting, “Geheimplan gegen Deutschland”, reporting that attendees included serving Alternative für Deutschland politicians and party staff, members of the CDU-adjacent Werteunion, and financiers, and that Sellner’s presentation had addressed the removal from Germany of three categories of people: asylum seekers, foreigners with residence rights, and “non-assimilated citizens” (Correctiv, 2024). The third category is different in kind: asylum and residence are matters of immigration law; citizenship is not. A programme that sorts citizens into assimilated and non-assimilated, with removal attached to the sorting, is the permission structure of this series stated as policy.

What followed measured how far the word had travelled and how much resistance it still met. Hundreds of thousands of Germans demonstrated in the streets in the largest protests the Federal Republic had seen in years. The Bundesverfassungsgericht debate about banning the AfD reignited. The city of Potsdam banned Sellner from entering Germany for three years. On 31 May 2024 the Potsdam administrative court lifted the ban in expedited proceedings, ruling that no real and sufficiently serious threat to public order had been demonstrated (LTO, 2024); Sellner marked the ruling by pledging on X to push “more and louder than ever” on remigration (AFP, 2024). And days after the Correctiv story broke, the Unwort des Jahres jury, the independent panel of German linguists that names the year’s most pernicious euphemism, announced its non-word for 2023: Remigration, chosen as a term that disguises a programme of expulsion as a neutral technical process (Sprachkritische Aktion Unwort des Jahres, 2024).

Participants sued. In February 2024 the legal scholar Ulrich Vosgerau succeeded on one of three points, a peripheral one. Correctiv amended certain formulations. In March 2026 the Landgericht Berlin ruled for the AfD MP Gerrit Huy, prohibiting three specific statements from the coverage as false factual assertions, among them the claim that a masterplan for the expulsion of German citizens had been presented; the ruling is not final and is subject to appeal (Brussels Signal, 2026). Sellner’s denial, verbatim: “I made very clear that no distinctions can be made between citizens — that there can be no second-class citizens — and that all remigration measures have to be legal.”

Nobody, including the participants, disputes that the meeting occurred, that Sellner spoke, that his subject was remigration or that AfD figures attended. The courts have policed the characterisation: the distance between discussed and planned, between a concept and a masterplan. In law that distance matters. Here it changes nothing, because the significance of Potsdam was never the plan. It was the guest list. A word coined to launder expulsion, carried for a decade by a banned movement, had been presented, by the banned movement’s frontman, to elected politicians of a party then polling second in Germany, and the politicians had come to listen. Twelve years from the roof at Poitiers to the antechamber of power. The packaging had been destroyed on schedule. The product had arrived.

IX. The Replatforming

Distribution was the last constraint, and in October 2022 that constraint was bought for $44 billion. Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter reversed, in a matter of months, the de-platforming structure that had restricted the network since 2018. As a result of a general amnesty for banned users, Sellner’s account was reinstated. The platform’s new owner also amplified the vocabulary itself. Ten days before the Potsdam meeting, on November 15th, 2023, Musk responded to a user posting accusations of Jewish communities instigating hatred against white people by saying the person “spoke the real truth” (CBS News, 2023); many major advertisers pulled-out but the amplification continued.

The word moved accordingly and it moved upmarket. On September 14th, 2024, during the fabricated panic of Haitians migrating to Springfield, OH, Donald Trump tweeted that he would “return Kamala’s illegal immigrants to their countries (otherwise referred to as remigration)” (Media Matters for America, 2024) . The parentheses are the giveaway: a Presidential Nominee introducing his audience to the technical term, similar to how salesmen introduce brands. In May 2025, the adoption became administrative: the State Departments reorganisation plan sent to Congress included an Office of Remigration as part of its refugee bureau, a center for “tracking repatriation” (The Guardian, 2025). By May 2026 the office was operational, processing payment reports in the tens of millions of dollars to support deportation efforts, with little oversight (Wired, 2026). Thirteen years after Poitiers, the word was printed on letterhead in the government of the United States. One year later it had employees and a budget.

The word arrived at the ballot box first in Europe and in Sellner’s own country. On September 29th, 2024, just 15 days after Trump’s tweet, the Freedom Party of Austria won the first far right national election victory of the post war republic on a manifesto called Fortress Austria which promised to create a more homogeneous nation through “Remigration of unwanted foreigners” (CNN, 2024). Herbert Kickl celebrated Election Night with members of the identitarian movement (K. La Revue, 2025). Six years earlier the word had belonged to a group under state surveillance. Now it had topped a national poll in the country where Sellner rebuilt it.

The movements own meetings were held again in public spaces. The First Remigration Summit met at a theater in Gallarate after Milan denied hosting it: approximately 400 attendees, a video message from an MEP of the Lega, and an Italian organiser thanking a Lega member who told parliament that remigration was the only solution (InfoMigrants, 2025). A year later the Second Summit of Remigration at Figueira Da Foz, Portugal attracted 500 participants along with a former head of the U.S. Border Patrol and the American White Nationalist Jared Taylor as VIP speakers, together with elected representatives of the AfD and Spaniards Vox (Politico Europe, 2026). A German activist banned from attending due to restrictions imposed upon him by his own government traveled 22 hours to attend and showed off his flight restriction notice from the podium. The organisation dissolved in 2021 as a private militia was, by 2026, hosting officials of allied governments at an annual policy conference dedicated to its word.

And in Britain, remigration found a carrier it had long awaited. Restore Britain was formed as a pressure group by Great Yarmouth MP Rupert Lowe in June of 2025 and was registered as a political party in February of 2026. Restore Britain made remigration central to its program. According to Restore Britain’s published proposals for removing foreign nationals based on benefit receipts and the inability to speak English (Blaze Media, 2026), its campaigns director and Senior Policy Fellow have promoted the use of the term openly (Hope Not Hate, 2026). Musk, having concluded that Reform UK was insufficiently committed, publicly urged his followers to join Lowe's party. Hope Not Hate reported this month that members of Remigration Now, an explicitly pro-mass-expulsion group, are joining Restore with the stated aim of pulling its policy further toward their own(Byline Times, 2026). A vocabulary that entered Britain in 2017 through a franchise that collapsed in ridicule is now the flagship policy of a registered party with a sitting MP and the patronage of the world's richest man.

Restore Britain is covered in the next part of this series.

X. Product Launch

A decade of counter-extremism destroyed vehicle after vehicle and never touched the cargo. France dissolved Génération Identitaire; three years later its frontman was presenting remigration to the AfD at Potsdam. The platforms banned the network; one change of ownership restored it. Britain turned the leadership back at the border; the vocabulary came in anyway. Germany barred Sellner from the country; a court let him back in within eleven weeks. The movement shed each banned vehicle and carried on, as it was designed to from the start; disposability was the lesson its founders took from the dissolution of Unité Radicale in 2002, and they built accordingly. And beneath the movement sat the actual cargo. "Remigration" is an ideology compressed into a word: behind the four syllables stand the replacement diagnosis, the complicit elite, the demand for a homogeneous nation, and removal as the remedy. The word is the form in which all of it travels, the one form that needs no vehicle and that no decree can reach. Engineered from the Nouvelle Droite onwards to survive its hosts the way a virus does.

Sellner’s Potsdam speech according to Correctiv identified three types of people that should be removed from society and one type was citizens. The FPÖ Manifesto combines remigration with creating a homogeneous nation. Restore Britains published proposal includes removing legally residing persons receiving welfare benefits as well as legally residing persons unable to speak English. Every version arrives at the same destination: the removal of people whose passports say they belong, on the grounds of what they are.

An idea that caused career-ending consequences when said aloud in 2012 is now declared party policy in Britain and an operational office of the United States Government. Benoist wagered that language precedes culture and culture precedes power. His wager finally began paying out fifty years later and it paid out fully. Somewhere, one of seventy who stood atop the roof at Poitiers or one of elderly men of Nouvelle Droite who knew that footage would eventually be worth more than the rooftop, is watching the word do the work without them and smiling. They understood something mainstream politics has been slow to grasp. Change what can be said, and you change what can be done.

Part Five will investigate Restore Britain.

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References

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