Labour Is Dying of Starmerism

The blank face of technocratic politics: Labour has removed the people it once claimed to represent, and now wonders why they have gone.

Labour did not inherit loyalty in 2024. It inherited exhaustion. That is the stark fact Keir Starmer has never understood or has understood and chosen to ignore because the alternative would require him to become a different kind of politician. Britain did not look at Starmer and see a movement or a moral project. It did not see a government-in-waiting animated by a deep hunger to change the lives of people who had been ground down by fourteen years of Conservative vandalism. It instead saw the end of something unbearable, and it took the exit.

Now the bill has arrived. The local election results are more than a normal mid-term warning or bit of rough weather for a new government. They are the sound of Labour’s borrowed voters breaking apart. The BBC reported Labour losing more than 280 seats while Reform had won more than 400 and taken control of councils including Newcastle-under-Lyme and Havering (BBC News, 2026a). Chris Mason’s BBC analysis described Labour losing around half the seats it was defending, including catastrophic results in places such as Tameside, where Labour defended 17 seats and lost 16 to Reform, and Wigan, where it lost all 22 seats it was defending to Reform (Mason, 2026). The Guardian’s mapped analysis called it Labour’s worst local election result on record and showed the party losing ground in different directions: to Reform on the right, to the Greens on the left, and in Wales to Plaid Cymru as Labour fell into third behind Plaid and Reform (The Guardian, 2026a).

That last point is significant because this is not simply a Reform surge with just right-wing voters drifting from the Conservatives to Farage. It is Labour being abandoned in several directions at once. The party’s problem is therefore much deeper than “messaging”. While voters have often heard about change, too many of them cannot feel any change in their own lives. The rent is still the rent. The NHS waiting list is still the NHS waiting list. The bus still does not come. The dentist is still not taking new patients. The bills still land before the wages do. A government can survive the charge that it has inherited a mess, but it cannot survive forever on the promise that managing the mess more calmly is the same as ending it.

Starmerism has confused the want to remove the Conservative party with a belief in his Labour party. That mistake was always going to be dangerous. It is now becoming existential.

The Country Asked for Change and Got Management

The great conceit of Starmer’s Labour was that Britain wanted to be reassured more than it wanted to be transformed. The theory was simple enough: Sound serious. Stand in front of flags. Speak in careful sentences. Avoid frightening anybody with money. Promise stability. Say “country first, party second”. Present politics as a kind of repair service for institutions. Let the Conservatives collapse into the pit they dug for everyone else.

For a short moment it was successful because the Conservatives had made themselves unendurable. It worked because the public had watched the Johnson circus, the Truss experiment, the Sunak afterthought, and the general spectacle of a governing party that had gone feral in office. Labour did not really need to inspire. It needed to be available.

But availability is not loyalty. Exhaustion is not consent. This is the central failure of Starmer’s government. It looked at a country that had crawled out of a burning building and assumed gratitude would be a permanent political settlement. It then governed as if nothing was urgent. The point of the 2024 election, in Starmer’s mind, appears to have been permission to administer decline with better manners. There would be discipline, fiscal rules, grown-up conversations, institutional respect, and a carefully rationed quantity of hope. The country would be told that the work of change had begun, even if the actual experience of change remained deferred into some permanently distant future.

This is not how people live. They do not experience “missions” in the abstract. They live through broken public services. They withstand housing costs. They endure wages that do not stretch. They live out the feeling that nothing works unless you are rich enough to buy your way around the failure. And then they hear Starmer talk as if the great moral task of politics is to avoid disturbing the people already comfortable with how Britain is arranged.

That is why Reform has room to breathe. Farage only needs to make the failure feel named. This is the danger we warned about in our earlier piece on Labour opening the door to Reform (Notes From Plague Island, 2025). The door is not hypothetical anymore — it is open and the draught is in the room.

Technocratic Triangulation Has Left Labour with Nothing to Say

There is a kind of politics that believes the public is a problem to be managed. It does not begin with people’s lives, but with risk. What can be said without alarming donors? What can be promised without upsetting the bond markets? What can be offered without giving the right-wing press a week of headlines? What can be focus-grouped into something that sounds like conviction without requiring any conviction to exist?

This is the politics of technocratic triangulation. It is human beings choosing to empty politics of danger and then congratulating themselves on their discipline. Starmer’s Labour has become very good at sanding down every edge until nothing can cut through. Every answer sounds rehearsed. Every moral question is converted into a process point; every crisis is treated as an exercise in message discipline. The result is a party that looks controlled… but not alive.

That is the governing logic of the project. Labour’s right learned how to conquer the party machine by disciplining MPs and reassuring business. It recognised how to signal to the establishment that the danger had passed. Ultimately, it understood how to defeat the left inside Labour.

But defeating your own members is not the same as winning the country. That is the hinge of the whole disaster because Labour has haemorrhaged members. The BBC reported in August 2025 that the party had lost almost 200,000 members over five years, falling from 532,046 at the end of 2019 to 333,235 at the end of 2024 (Morton, 2025). Labour’s own accounts put the end-2024 membership figure at 333,235, down from 370,450 a year earlier (The Labour Party, 2025). The official annual report for 2023 had already recorded a fall from 407,455 in 2022 to 370,450 in 2023 (The Labour Party, 2024).

This is the very foundation supporting the party. Members are not decorative or an embarrassing legacy of a time before professional politics. They are the people who knock doors in the rain, and who explain a candidate to a neighbour. They are the people who notice when a local issue has become a national feeling. They provide the connective social tissue of a party, and are the difference between a political movement and a brand with an email list. That is why the video matters so much:

In February 2023, Starmer said Labour had “changed permanently” under his leadership, adding: “if you don’t like that, if you don’t like the changes that we’ve made, I say the door is open, and you can leave” (BBC News, 2023). This is the method, spoken plainly. It is the sound of a leader addressing a party as though politics were a tenancy agreement and dissenters were troublesome occupants.

Then came the uglier echo. During the Gaza crisis, Labour NEC member Mish Rahman wrote in openDemocracy that an unnamed party official had allegedly described Muslims resigning from Labour as the party “shaking off the fleas” (Rahman, 2023). Because that phrase was reported as an allegation from an unnamed source, it should be treated carefully. But the reason it travelled was that it sounded like something many members already suspected about the leadership’s view of them: that people with inconvenient principles were contaminants to be removed, not human beings to be persuaded.

Consider the two moments together. “If you don’t like it, you can leave.” “Shaking off the fleas.” One is on camera, the other is reported as an allegation. They are not identical, but they belong to the same political reflex: a leadership culture that hears dissent not as a democratic warning, nor as evidence that part of Labour’s moral coalition is in pain, but as something to be cleaned out.

The brutal irony is that the fleas are not there to knock the doors anymore. Labour spent years showing activists that their politics, anger, local knowledge and sometimes their very presence were disposable. It shifted its emotional centre away from the people who gave the party voluntary labour and towards the people who could give it cheques.

Politico reported in 2023 that Starmer told a business roundtable he wanted those present to help “mold” Labour’s plans and have their “fingerprints” on what the party was doing, according to people present (Boscia and Bloom, 2023). The Independent reported that Lord Sainsbury returned to Labour with a £2 million donation after cutting ties during the Corbyn era, while business figures were asking how to “get on board” with the party (Forrest, 2023). So yes, the money came. Labour’s own 2024 accounts report donations of £39.427 million, up from £16.509 million in 2023, while the treasurer’s report says the party achieved “notable increases in high value donations that far exceeded the previous year” (The Labour Party, 2025). During the 2024 general election campaign, the BBC reported that Labour declared more donations than all other parties combined, raising more than £9.5 million between dissolution and polling day; Lord Sainsbury alone gave £2.5 million, and more than £8 million came from ten sources (Wainwright, 2024).

Of course, parties need money. Campaigns, organisers, offices, leaflets, staff, compliance, technology and election material all cost money. The question is not whether Labour should raise funds, but what kind of party it becomes when its deepest anxieties are organised around donor comfort and institutional reassurance, rather than member energy and public need.

Large donors do not canvass for you. They do not stand outside a polling station with a rosette in the cold or spend a Saturday persuading a disillusioned voter that the party still cares about their school, their high street, their hospital. They do not rebuild trust in towns where trust has been broken over decades. Money can buy adverts, glossy leaflets, data, consultants, events and access. It cannot, however, buy a living party.

Labour’s own annual report boasted that during the short 2024 general election campaign the party spoke to three million voters, made 300,000 phone calls, delivered 70 million pieces of print, and saw more than 34,000 people volunteer for the first time (The Labour Party, 2024). Those numbers tell their own story. Even in the age of data dashboards and targeted ads, campaigns still depend on human beings physically and socially carrying politics into the world.

So, what happens when those human beings stop believing the party wants them? We are now seeing the answer. The machine can still produce leaflets, but the living connection is fraying. The people who once defended Labour in workplaces, WhatsApp groups, school gates and family arguments are tired of being treated as disposable. Some have left and found other homes, while others are waiting for a reason not to give up.

A donor can fund a campaign office. A member gives that office a reason to exist. This is the floor Labour kicked out from beneath itself; now it is discovering gravity.

Reform is What Walks into the Vacuum

Reform’s rise should not be treated as sorcery. Farage is not some irresistible force summoned from the deep history of the English psyche. He is just a skilled political opportunist operating in a country whose institutions have failed to defend their own legitimacy. He understands something Starmer does not: anger is political material.

Sir John Curtice’s BBC analysis described British electoral politics as “highly fragmented”, with Reform averaging 26% in sampled wards and doing best in heavily Leave-voting areas (Curtice, 2026). Labour’s vote was down 16 points compared with 2022 and 19 points compared with 2024, with the party especially weak in previous Labour strongholds and in wards where many people identify as Muslim (Curtice, 2026).

That is the pattern of a party losing its ability to hold together a coalition. Reform takes one kind of anger. The Greens / Plaid / SNP / Independents take another. The old Labour calculation was that the left had nowhere else to go and the right could be pacified by hardening the language on migration, flags, policing and fiscal restraint. That calculation is now collapsing because voters to Labour’s left do have somewhere else to go. Voters in places Labour once considered safe have shown they are willing to punish the party directly. Muslim voters, younger voters, renters, climate voters, anti-war voters, public-sector workers, and communities that feel morally insulted by the leadership’s choices cannot simply be rounded up at election time with a lecture about responsibility.

Nor can Labour out-Farage Farage. That path leads only to humiliation. When Labour accepts Reform’s emotional frame, it grants Reform ownership of the problem. It tells voters that Farage is asking the right questions, then pleads to be trusted with softer answers. That is surrender.

The danger of Reform is not that it wins councils or parliamentary seats. The danger is that it reorganises British politics around the idea that every failure of the state is really the fault of someone weaker than you. Migrants. Muslims. Refugees. Trans people. The left. The human rights lawyer. The foreign court. The woke council. The enemy changes, but the structure remains the same. Economic pain is redirected downward and outward, away from the people who actually possess power.

That is why Labour’s failure is so grave. A social-democratic party exists, at minimum, to stop that redirection. It exists to say: your life is hard because power has been organised against you, not because someone poorer than you has taken your place. It exists to turn private despair into collective politics. When it stops doing that, the right does not need to invent the wound; it only needs to infect it, and Starmer’s Labour has left the wound wide open.

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Burnham is the Last Off-Ramp

This is why the leadership question cannot be avoided. The argument for Starmer staying now depends on a fantasy: that the same political method that produced the crisis can somehow solve it if only it is delivered with more urgency. It cannot.

The BBC reported that Labour MPs were openly blaming Starmer after the election blow, with some publicly calling for him to resign or set a timetable; one MP told the BBC there had been “one issue on the door and it was Keir”, while another said voters did not hate Labour but “they did hate Keir” (BBC News, 2026b). The Guardian reported that Starmer’s leadership was on the line after the disastrous results, including Labour losing every council seat it contested in Hartlepool to Reform (Stacey, 2026).

Beyond personal unpopularity, Starmer now embodies the failure. He is the face of the promise that change could be postponed, managed, narrowed and still believed. He is the politician who told the country that seriousness would be enough, then discovered that the veneer of seriousness without material improvement curdles into contempt.

And what did he reach for when the pressure came? He reached backwards, to a politics incapable of admitting that the New Labour spell has worn off. Starmer appointed Harriet Harman as an unpaid part-time adviser on women and girls, and Gordon Brown as a special envoy on global finance, after the election mauling and amid growing pressure over his leadership (Ali, 2026). Brown is not some neutral technocrat descending from the clouds. He was chancellor for a decade under Tony Blair and then prime minister after him.

It is not that Harman and Brown know nothing or that their experience is useless. It is that Starmer appears unable to imagine political repair except as a return to the personnel, habits and emotional grammar of the Blair-Brown years. He keeps trying to solve a crisis of trust with the faces of the world that helped create the distrust. He thinks people are asking for more competence, reassurance, and more grown-ups in the room. But many people have had a room full of grown-ups for decades and still cannot get a dentist, a secure home, a decent wage, a bus that arrives, or a government that seems to understand the scale of their anger.

This is why he does not get it. He hears rejection and translates it into a staffing problem. He sees Reform rising, Labour members leaving, voters splintering and activists exhausted, and his instinct is to call in the old household gods of neoliberal Labour management. But the country is not pining for another New Labour tribute act. The public mood is not nostalgia for 1997 staged by consultants who have mistaken memory for mandate. People do not want to be told that the same political family will somehow feel different this time if only the branding is refreshed.

Andy Burnham is not a saviour. There is no messianic fix for a party that has gouged its own base and allowed Reform to become the loudest voice in the room. Burnham would not automatically repair trust with Muslim voters or easily win back the left. He would not spontaneously defeat Farage. He is not magical, but he is the only plausible off-ramp inside Labour’s existing universe.

The Guardian reported that Labour MPs had turned to Burnham as Starmer came under pressure, with allies preparing a manifesto and exploring possible routes for him to return to Westminster (The Guardian, 2026b). Another obstacle is that he cannot become Labour leader unless he is an MP (BBC News, 2026b). A Guardian report on a Compass poll of Labour members found 45% wanted Starmer to step down, 51% did not believe he could turn the polls around, and 42% ranked Burnham as their first-choice successor, although the poll’s political context should be treated with care because Compass is linked to Mainstream, a Labour caucus backing a Burnham bid (Elgot, 2026).

The point is not that Burnham is perfect but that he speaks a language Starmer cannot convincingly learn. He sounds rooted in place and civic rather than managerial. He appears to be someone who understands that public services are not abstract delivery mechanisms but the daily architecture of dignity. He has a regional base and a political identity not wholly manufactured in Westminster. He can talk about buses, housing, work, care and belonging without sounding as though the words have been cleared by six advisers and a donor-facing risk committee.

That is important because Reform’s appeal is emotional before it is administrative. People move to Farage because he offers them a story in which their anger has a target. Labour needs a leader who can offer a better story with a material offer behind it. Burnham could take the air from Reform’s sails because he could make Labour sound human again. Success wouldn’t be a guarantee, but it would mark a rupture with the dead language of Starmerism; a sign that the party understands the emergency is not presentational but existential.

Parties Die When They Stop Meaning Anything

The Labour Party is now in danger of becoming an institution whose main argument for existence is that something worse might happen without it. That is not enough. It is insufficient to tell people to vote Labour because Reform is dangerous, even though Reform is dangerous. It is paltry to tell people to be patient, even though rebuilding a country takes time. It is inadequate to blame the Conservatives, even though the Conservatives bear enormous responsibility for the damage Britain is living through. A governing party has to do more than point at the arsonists who came before it. It has to put out the fire.

Starmer’s Labour has failed to grasp the emotional meaning of its own victory. People wanted the country to feel different. They wanted proof that politics could still reach into ordinary life and make something less humiliating, less anxious, less cruel. They wanted wages that stretched further, services that answered, homes that could be afforded, streets that felt cared for, and a government that spoke to them like citizens rather than stakeholders. Instead, they got management.

The existential danger for Labour is not simply that it may lose the next general election. It is that people may stop seeing it as necessary. That is how parties die. Not all at once, and not always with one dramatic defeat. They die when their old voters can no longer explain what emotional or material purpose they serve. They die when their activists no longer feel wanted. They die when their leaders mistake access for power, donors for roots, caution for seriousness, and office for meaning.

Labour can still thwart Reform. Britain is not condemned to Farage, but it will not happen by pretending the local election results are just a communications challenge. It will not happen through another relaunch, another grid, another set of lines about delivery. And it certainly will not happen while Starmer remains the embodiment of a politics that has already failed its central test.

The party opened the door to Reform by offering a country in pain almost nothing it could feel. Now Reform is walking through it. If Labour wants to close that door, Starmer has to go. And if the party still has any instinct for survival, it should understand that Burnham is not the luxury option, but the last available proof that Labour might still remember how to sound human, to organise hope, and become something more than a donor-funded machine for administering decline. Labour has not just stumbled. It has spent years tearing up the very ground that once held it in place.

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References

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